

Top Secret 233

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Friday October 15, 1976

CI NIDC 76-242C

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Friday October 15, 1976.

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The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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
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CUBA: Rally

25X1 [] //Cuba appears to be preparing its strongest propaganda blast at the US in years. The bodies of some of the victims of last week's Cuban airliner crash off Barbados were put on display yesterday in Havana. The media are blaming Cuban exiles for the crash and accusing the US of complicity.//

25X1 [] //Hundreds of thousands are to attend an outdoor meeting to hear a "funeral oration" this morning. Although the speaker's name was not announced, it most likely will be Prime Minister Castro himself.//



25X1 [] //The rally may serve a further purpose--to deflect attention from the country's economic problems and the increased austerity that will result. He has used this tactic in the past, most notably in 1970 when he denounced the US

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for an exile terrorist incident in order to divert attention from Cuba's failure to meet a highly publicized production goal. He probably also hopes to use the incident--which has aroused considerable alarm in the eastern Caribbean--to alienate countries in the area from the US. [REDACTED]

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USSR-CHINA: Warning

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[REDACTED] Soviet "journalist" Victor Louis has written an article for the *London Evening News* and *France-Soir* expressing Moscow's delight over the ouster of China's leftists, particularly Mao's widow, Chiang Ching. The article was almost certainly authorized at a high level.

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[REDACTED] Louis' main point seems to be that if China's moderates are inclined toward less hostile relations with the USSR, they should give some positive sign to Moscow. Louis also goes so far as to say that the Soviets want some signal within the next month. He mentioned "new" anti-Soviet statements by the Chinese leadership, implying that the diminution of such propaganda might be one such signal.

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[REDACTED] Louis asserts that older Soviet leaders are inclined to give the Chinese more time to sort themselves out but are under pressure from younger less "sentimental" officials who have no first-hand knowledge of dealing with the Chinese. Louis implies that this could be China's last chance for preventing hardliners in the USSR from getting Moscow to take "irreversible" decisions on China.

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[REDACTED] Louis also makes a blatant appeal to China's military of the older generation which Louis credits with appreciating the Soviet role in China's development and Soviet military might.

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[REDACTED] Louis' effort probably reflects growing Soviet unhappiness that the Chinese have not responded to its restraint and its gestures since Mao's death. In publicly setting a time limit and making thinly veiled threats about irreversible decisions, the article is not conciliatory. The USSR may hope that such a tack will bring results where affirmative gestures have failed.

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[] In August 1969, Louis published an article about the possibility of a pre-emptive Soviet strike on China's nascent nuclear force, which was undoubtedly a factor in China's decision to agree to the Sino-Soviet summit in September 1969 and to engage in border talks. []

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RHODESIA: Conference Delegations

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[] Prime Minister Ian Smith and black nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo have announced the composition of their delegations to the conference that Britain has called for the purpose of forming an interim Rhodesian government to prepare the country for legal independence under black majority rule. The conference is scheduled to begin on October 25, and preliminary discussions are to start four days earlier.

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[] Two other invited black leaders--Robert Mugabe, who joined Nkomo in a tactical "patriotic front" last week, and Bishop Muzorewa--have not yet announced the make-up of their delegations.

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[] Smith's delegation contains both white moderates and hardliners. Nkomo has included white legal advisers and a sympathetic former Rhodesian prime minister, Garfield Todd, as political adviser, in the large group he is taking to Geneva.

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[] Muzorewa reportedly had problems putting a delegation together; many of his supporters are scattered in exile and in detention in Rhodesia. Yesterday, however, he announced that he and his delegation would arrive in Geneva before October 25.

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[] Mugabe, secretary general of the militant Zimbabwe African National Union and spokesman for most of the guerrillas, may have more serious difficulty in forming a delegation. He is continuing to seek a delay in the conference but has reduced his request from two weeks to one. On October 13, Mugabe went back to Mozambique, where most guerrillas are based, for further consultations between the military commanders and nationalist political leaders.

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[redacted] One of the key people Mugabe wants at Geneva is Josiah Tongogara, ZANU's top military commander, who has been in a Zambian jail since March 1975, when he was arrested following a violent clash between rival groups in ZANU. Tongogara is now on trial for the assassination of one of his rivals, and President Kaunda has thus far refused Mugabe's request to release him, insisting that the judicial process cannot be interfered with.

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[redacted] Mugabe and other senior ZANU officials are said to want Tongogara associated with any agreement that might be reached at the conference in order to ensure the acceptance of guerrilla commanders in the field.//

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